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DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES: AN
ARGUMENT FOR ADOPTING
THE MAJORITY APPROACH
ROBERT H. EPSTEIN*
Due-on-sale clauses are mortgage agreement provisions which al-
low lenders to accelerate the due date on loans when borrowers sell
secured property.' Courts question whether the exercise of due-on-
sale clauses in security agreements by state chartered institutional
lenders2 constitute a restraint on alienation of property.3 While states
* B.A, Boston University, 1980; J.D., Washington University, 1983.
I. A due-on-sale clause "provides the lender an option to declare immediately
due and payable all of the sums owed to the lender if all or any part of the real
property securing the loan is sold or otherwise transferred by the borrower without
the lender's prior consent." Glendale Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp.
903. 904 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
A typical due-on-sale clause reads as follows:
Should Trustor [mortgagor] sell, convey, transfer, dispose of. . .said property,
or any part thereof, or any interest therein, or agree to do so without the consent
of Beneficiary [mortgagee] being first obtained, then Beneficiary (mortgagee)
shall have the right, at its option, to declare all sums secured hereby forthwith
due and payable.
LaSala v. American Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 869, 489 P.2d 1113, 1115, 97
Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1971).
2. This Note does not consider in detail whether restraints on alienation occur
when institutional lenders exercise due-on-sale clauses. For cases considering this
question, see Dawn Investment Co., Inc. v. Superior Court of the State of Cal.,
County of Los Angeles, 116 Cal. App. 3d 439, 172 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1981) (by measur-
ing the quantum of restraint against the justification of restraint, the court found the
exercise of a due-on-sale clause valid applying the general rule that acceleration
clauses are not per se unlawful); Pas v. Hill, 87 Cal. App. 3d 521, 151 Cal. Rptr. 98
(1978) (The court distinguished Wellenkamp by applying it only to institutional lend-
ers. The court treats a conveyance as an encumbrance rather than an outright sale
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vary in their treatment of this issue,4 almost all courts have held that
due-on-sale clauses are valid per se.5 A majority of state courts pre-
sume the validity of the clause, squarely placing the burden to rebut
on the mortgagor or his assignee.6 Conversely, the minority of states
uphold the validity of due-on-sale clauses only if institutional lenders
reasonably exercise them.7
In contrast with the minority rule, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB) passed a regulation which allows federally chartered
institutional lenders to use the accelerator provision.' While the
FHLBB policy is consistent with the majority approach, federal and
when a private lender attempted to exercise a first trust deed due-on-sale clause after
trustor conveyed real property to junior mortgagee in lieu of foreclosure by the jun-
ior). For an extended discussion, see Note, Due-on-Sale Clauses: 4 SuggestedAp-
proachfor Dealing with Non-Institutional Lenders, 8 WEST. ST. U.L. R~v. 59 (1980).
3. Jurisdictions differ on what constitutes a unreasonable restraint on the aliena-
tion of property when considering due-on-sale clauses. For a detailed discussion, see
infra notes 41-115 and accompanying text. For purposes of this Note, property shall
mean real property.
4. Recent controversy discusses whether to apply federal or state law to federally
chartered savings and loan associations. Federal law permits the use of due-on-sale
clauses in security agreements; some state courts invoke a reasonableness test on an
adhoc basis, holding the clause unenforceable absent a proper showing. See Fidelity
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (while state court
barred use of due-on-sale clause, Supreme Court upheld the use of the accelerator
clause); Comment, Holiday Acres v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n: Preemption of
the Due-on-Sale Clause, 23 URBAN L. ANN. 285 (1982) (a detailed and constructive
analysis of the federal preemption question).
5. See infra notes 47-62 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 167-81 and accompanying text. Enforcement of a due-on-sale
clause might prevent a homeowner from selling his property.
8. 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f)(6) (1982). In the midst of the Great Depression when
almost one-half of the people holding home mortgage loans defaulted, Congress en-
acted the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA) 12 U.S.C. § 1246 (1933). The depressed
economic situation forced state and local lenders to cease doing business. As a result,
almost 25 percent of the population was unable to obtain home loans. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 210, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). By 1933 over 1,500 state S & L's
had to close their doors. Congress enacted the HOLA to improve the deficiencies of
the state systems by creating a federally-sponsored program to regulate the home
mortgage industry, which had previously been the province of the states. See Confer-
ence of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir. 1979), affd,
445 U.S. 921 (1980). The act created a system of federally chartered S & L's. To
regulate these newly created lenders, section 5(a) of HOLA established the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The FHLBB's purpose was to issue rules to gov-
ern the administration of federal S & L's. The FHLBB received broad powers to
issue rules and regulations. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1976).
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state laws clash in minority states.9 The conflicting policies give rise
to an anomaly because state chartered lenders may not unreasonably
apply due-on-sale clauses, yet federally chartered lenders have the
authority to invoke these provisions.'" Judicial determination of the
enforceability of due-on-sale clauses is important because the ulti-
mate resolution of this issue will have an overwhelming effect on the
interests on institutional lenders and homeowners."
This Note considers the relative interests of institutional lenders
and homeowners through an examination of less intrusive alterna-
tives to due-on-sale provisions. And it examines the conflict between
state and federally chartered lenders in minority jurisdictions. Part I
considers the development of restraints on alienation, focusing upon
those factors courts find relevant in determining whether there is an
impermissible restraint. By examining applicable cases, Part II ex-
plains the different tests and ratios courts adopt to determine the va-
lidity of due-on-sale clauses. Part III analyzes the attributes and
deficiencies of these tests and examines the conflicting interests of the
institutional lenders and homeowners. Part IV proposes alternative
approaches to due-on-sale clauses which reconcile competing inter-
ests and avoid unnecessary restraints on alienation.
I. RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION
Some courts have invalidated the enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses, reasoning that the application of the accelerator provision
unreasonably impairs a borrower's ability to sell his property.' 2 For
centuries courts have recognized that the owner of an absolute estate
enjoys an inherent right to alienate his fee.' 3 Restraints on alienation
9. See infra notes 86-115 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 45, 116-53.
11. See infra notes 31-33.
12. See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 6 I11. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1
(1975) (provision in mortgage requiring mortgagee's consent to sale of property con-
stituted a restraint on alienation); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. and Loan, 73 Mich.
App. 163. 168, 250 N.E.2d 804, 809 (1977) (due-on-sale clause restrains vendor's abil-
ity to alienate property). See also Volkmer, The Application of the Restraint on Aliena-
tion Doctrine to Real Property Security Transactions, 58 IowA L. REv. 747, 774 (1973).
Cf. Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concerning Direct Restraints on Alienation, 57
MICH. L. REV. 1173 (1959).
13. See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1114 (2d ed.
1956) [hereinafter cited as SIMEs & SMITH]. "The statute Quia Emptores established
the rule that all tenants in fee simple could freely alienate their land." Id. at 6.
1984]
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of property, 4 which commentators classify as direct 5 and indirect, 6
arise upon the interference with this right. Courts identify three types
of direct restraints: disabling, 7 forfeiture' and promissory.' 9 Al-
though these classifications are mechanical, they are important be-
cause each receives different treatment from courts.20
Authorities define a direct restraint as a clause in a legal instru-
ment which expressly prevents the holder from conveying his prop-
erty.2 ' Since direct restraints preclude free alienability of property,
courts consistently invalidate their use.22 Judges do not favor disa-
bling restraints on fee simple estates because of the resulting un-
marketability of the subjected properties until the limitation period
passes.23 Forfeiture restraints, which extinguish an estate when its
14. A restraint on alienation is a provision which by its terms, prohibits or penal-
izes the exercise of the power of alienation. These restraints are of three types: disa-
bling restraints, forfeiture restraints, and promissory restraints. Id. § 112, at 237. The
Restatement defines a restraint on alienation as "an attempt by an otherwise effective
conveyance or contract to cause a later conveyance: a) to be void; or b) to impose
contractual liability on the one who makes the later conveyance when such liability
results from a breach of an agreement not to convey; or c) to terminate or subject to
termination all or a part of the property interest conveyed." RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTY § 404, at 2381 (1944) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
15. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. "[A]n indirect restraint on
alienation arises when an attempt is made to accomplish some purpose other than the
restraint of alienability, but with the incident result that the instrument, if valid,
would restrain practical alienability." SIMES & SMITH, supra note 13, § 1112, at 5.
17. See infra note 23. "A disabling restraint exists when property is conveyed or
devised with direction that it shall not be alienated. It is commonly designed to se-
cure the continued enjoyment of the property to the conveyee, and if valid, it would
operate to remove the power of alienation as a characteristic of the estate granted."
SIMES & SMITH, supra note 13, § 1131, at 17.
18. Unlike a disabling restraint, a forfeiture restraint "always involves the crea-
tion of a future interest. It exists when, by the terms of an instrument of transfer, the
estate transferred will be subject to forfeiture on alienation or will be terminated."
Id. § 112, at 238.
19. "The term promissory restraint refers to a convenant in an instrument of con-
veyance, or to a contract, in which the promissor agrees not to alienate the property."
Id.
20. Seeid. § 1132, at 18.
21. Id. § 1131, at 17. To create a direct restraint, one must insert a clause which
specifically prohibits a property holder from alienating it.
22. See Volkmersupra note 12, at 749. See also Bernhard, supra note 12, at 1173,
1174.
23. See Bernhard, supra note 12, at 1173. Courts have decided that disabling re-
straints on estates held in fee simple or less than fee simple are void. Butterfield v.
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holder attempts to convey it, are not as paralyzing as disabling re-
straints.24 Nevertheless, forfeiture restraints are also void because
they deny title.25 To enforce a promissory restraint, where the parties
agree to the restraint mutually, the grantor must resort to equitable
contract remedies because the power to restrain inheres in the
agreement.26
While direct restraints are generally inimical to fee simple estates,
the law regards indirect restraints less severely,27 for courts enforce
them although the effect of doing so renders land inalienable.28
While the law enforces certain types of restraints,29 there are also
compelling social and economic reasons for rejecting others." Direct
restraints prevent property owners from conveying, thereby reducing
Reed. 160 Mass. 361, 35 N.E. 1128 (1893) (disabling restraint on life estate void);
Randolph v. Wilkinson, 294 Ill. 508, 128 N.E. 525 (1920) (disabling restraint on estate
for years invahd); Payne v. Hart, 178 Ark. 100, 9 S.W.2d 1059 (1928) (courts reject
disabling restraint on fee simple estate).
Spendthrift trusts constitute the only exception to the rule voiding disabling re-
straints Volkmer, supra note 12, at 1149; Bernhard, supra note 12, at 1175. The
reason for this exception lies in the belief that courts should avoid invalidating an
instrument which reasonably prevents imprudent individuals from disposing of their
estates. Furthermore, courts are less likely to upset an equitable estate created for the
benefit of the grantee than a legal one. See generally GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT
TRUSTS (2d ed. 1947). See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 13, § 1139, at 27.
24. Forfeiture restraints definitively deny title, whereas disabling restraints may
require a great deal of time to extinguish an interest. Id. § 1131, at 17.
25, See Bernhard, supra note 12, at 1174.
26. Arguably, promissory restraints are similar to indirect restraints because they
.operate only indirectly to affect alienation." However, courts have treated them as
similar in effect. See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 13, § 1161, at 73. See also Bernhard,
supra note 12, at 1174.
27. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 404, at 1005, 1006. Cf. SIMES & SMITH,
supra note 13. § 1201, at 88, which states that any provision which tends to prevent
the marketability of land restrains alienation.
28. See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 13, § 1201, at 88. One exception to this ap-
proach is the rule against perpetuities. The rule against perpetuities precludes giving
legal effect to interests which are too remote to vest "not later than twenty-one years
after some life in being at the creation of the interest." J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES, § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
29. See Bernhard, supra note 12, at 1175. See generally Goddard, Non-A4ssign-
ment Provisions in Land Contracts, 31 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1932).
30. According to an authority, courts initially voided restraints as repugnant to a
fee simple interest in property. SIMES & SMITH, supra note 13, § 1134, at 21. Simes &
Smith recognize, however, that there is a sound reason to invaliate these impair-
ments--economic undesirability. Id., § 1135, at 21.
1984]
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the total amount of land in the marketplace.3' A creditor seeking to
satisfy debts of a landowner who, by the express terms of the con-
tract, cannot convey must forego attaching the property to collect the
debt.32 The inability to use the land efficiently puts it in a state of
dormancy which constitutes waste.3 3 The result is that courts invali-
date instruments which restrain a property holder's ability to transfer
his property.
In theory, due-on-sale clauses do not directly restrain alienation.34
To free himself from the operation of the clause, the mortgagor may
31. See Bernhard, supra note 12, at 179. See also SIMES & SMITH, supra note 13,
§ 1117, at 10.
The necessity of imposing restraint on the power of protracting the acquisition of
the absolute interest in, or dominion over property, will be obvious, if we con-
sider, for a moment, what would be the state of a community in which a consid-
erable portion of the land and capital was locked up. That free and active
circulation of property, which is one of the springs as well as the consequences of
commerce, would be obstructed; the capital of the country gradually withdrawn
from trade; and the incentives to exertion in every branch of industry dimin-
ished. Indeed, such a state of things would be utterly inconsistent with national
prosperity.
T. JARMAN, WILLS § 219 (6th ed. 1896). See also 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 26-30 (1952).
32. If considered on a larger scale, should all landowners' property within an area
become unattachable, the result would include the diminution of the land's value and
the subsequent halt to the extension of credit. See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 13,
§ 1135, at 21.
33. Id., § 1117, at 11. As a matter of common sense, property owners expend
funds needlessly by making improvements to real estate when their interest in the
land ceases upon alienation. By encouraging waste, restraints are counter-productive
to the longstanding social policy of property improvement. Restrained property is
therefore ineffective to meet the public need for commercially viable land. See Bern-
hard, supra note 12, at 1180. "Dead hand control" shackles property.
While society recognizes the desire of a property owner to control the distribu-
tion of his property after his death, it also recognizes that life is for the living and
not for the dead. Thus, the wishes of the passing generation to better property
must be balanced against the desires of the coming generation to take property
without restraint.
Id.
34. See Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545
P.2d 546 (1976) (due-on-sale clauses valid as they do not restrain alienation); Mutual
Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wisc. 2d 531, 239 N.W.2d 20
(1976) (due-on-sale clause is valid because it does not prevent mortgagor from alien-
ating his property). See also G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
FINANCE LAW (1st ed. 1979) at 298 [hereinafter cited as OSBORNE]. But cf. Volkmer,
supra note 12, at 773, 774, which states that a due-on-sale clause "is so closely akin to
a promissory restraint as to justify designating it as a direct restraint." Id.
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either obtain the lender's consent or convey the property.35  Yet in
practice, lenders seldom consent and mortgagors often lack the finan-
cial resources to satisfy the debt.36 In fact, courts react differently in
response to the exercise of due-on-sale clauses by lenders.37 Courts
that uphold the validity of such clauses declare inter alia that the ac-
celerator provision poses no restraint.3 ' These courts believe that the
application of the clause does not deny the mortgagor his right to sell
the property, but rather that it allows the mortgagor to receive a rea-
sonable return rate which comports with economic trends. 39 Con-
versely, other courts invalidate the clauses on the ground that they
constitute unreasonable impairments.4 ° After a survey of the various
types of restraints and the policy reasons for voiding them, it is ap-
propriate to examine court decisions to determine the reasons why
different state courts allow or deny the enforcement of due-on-sale
clauses.
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES AND THE
RESTRAINT DOCTRINE
Judicial treatment of due-on-sale clauses varies among the states.4 '
35. See OSBORNE, supra note 34, at 298.
36. If a lender refuses to allow a third party to assume the mortgage and the
homeowner cannot afford to remit the balance, the clause impairs the homeowner's
ability to convey. See Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate
Financing in California in Times of Fluctuating interest Rates-Legal Issues and Alter-
natives, 6 U.S.F. L. REV. 267, 275 (1972).
37. Compare Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379 (1978) (absent reasonable justification mortgagees may not use due-on-sale
clauses); Tucker v. Lassen Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116
Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974) (application of due-on-sale clauses valid only in outright sales of
property) with Occidental Say. and Loan Ass'n. v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469,
293 N.W.2d 843 (1980) (mortgagee's use of due-on-sale clause isperse valid); Crock-
ett v. First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n., 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1978) (due-on-
sale clauses which do not restrain alienation are valid and enforceable); Gunther v.
White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973) (accelerator provision in deed of trust valid al-
though motive for use based on receiving greater interest rate).
38. See supra note 34.
39. Id.
40. Baltimore Life Ins. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971) (accelera-
tion clause clearly restrains mortgagor's ability to dispose of property); Nichols v.
Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. and Loan, 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977) (due-on-
sale clause in mortgage agreement constitutes restraint on vendor's ability to alienate
property).
41. Compare Baker v. Loves Park Say. and Loan Ass'n, 61111. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d
19841
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Nonetheless, one may generalize. All courts enforce the exercise of
due-on-sale provisions if a party shows reasonable grounds for their
application.a2 Differences arise, however, in the judicial allocation of
the burden of proof. The majority of courts declare due-on-sale
clauses presumptively valid. 3 Therefore, the homeowner bears the
onus of demonstrating unreasonableness. 44 In contrast, a minority of
jurisdictions enforce the clause only when lenders substantiate the
need for its use.a" This Note focuses on California court decisions
which cover both majority and minority approaches.46
1 (1975) (exercise of due-on-sale clause valid when protecting mortgagee's security);
Century Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558
(1976) (mortgagee has right to strict enforcement of due-on-sale clause unless default
of which he complains is attributable to the mortgagee himself); Gunther v. White,
489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973) (acceleration provision in deed of trust valid although
motive for use based on receiving greater interest rate) with First S. Fed. Say. and
Loan of Mobile v. Britton, 345 So. 2d 300 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977) (use of due-on-sale
clause is coercive if invoked solely to extract a higher rate of interest); Tucker v.
Pulaski Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark, 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972) (mortgagee
may not foreclose on property absent justifiable reason). Commentators have had
difficulty categorizing the varying approaches of the courts because of the differing
criteria articulated by each. Id. See OSBORNE, supra note 34, at 302-03. See also
Note, Judicial Treatment of the Due on Sale Clause: The Casefor Adopting Standards
ofReasonableness, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1117 (1975).
42. See OSBORNE, supra note 34, at 303. The authors state that "[n]o court...
has held a due-on-sale clause to be a per se invalid restraint on alienation." Id. For
cases substantiating this point, see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
43. See OSBORNE, supra note 34, at 303.
44. See Century Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J. Super 48, 53,
364 A.2d 558, 561 (1976) (mortgagor bears the burden of showing the unlawful exer-
cise of a due-on-sale clause). But f. Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 252
Ark. 849, 853, 481 S.W.2d 725, 728 (1972) (mortgagee may not foreclose on property
absent justifiable reason).
45. Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971) (burden
of valid exercise of due-on-sale clause on mortgagee), cert. denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494
P.2d 1322 (1972); Clark v. Lackenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583, 585 (Fla. App. 1970) (mort-
gagee must prove actual harm before equity court will permit use of due-on-sale
clause); Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61, 64 (Miss. 1975) (while a due-on-sale clause
indirectly restrains alienation, it is not per se invalid providing that the mortgagee
shows that the clause's use is not unreasonable).
46. In other jurisdictions decisions have varied, see e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Say.
and Loan Ass'n, 61 IM. 2d 119, 126, 333 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1975) (exercise of due-on-sale
clause valid when protecting mortgagees security); Crockett v First Fed. Say. and
Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 631, 224 S.E.2d 580, 596 (1976); Gunther v. White, 489
S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tenn. 1973) (accelerator provision in deed of trust valid although
motive for use based on receiving greater interest rate).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol26/iss1/4
DUE-ON-SALE CLAUSES
A. Background Decisions Upholding the Exercise of Due-On-Sale
Clauses
In Coast Bank v. Minderhout,47 the Supreme Court of California
upheld the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause, deciding that the
common law rule against restraints improperly interfered with a
lender's legitimate interest.48 Coast Bank, the mortgagee, financed
property secured by a mortgage agreement which contained a due-
on-sale clause.49 The problem arose when the mortgagor conveyed
the property without the bank's knowledge and consent. The bank
initiated foreclosure proceedings because the unauthorized convey-
ance expressly violated the mortgage." In affirming the lower court
decision which permitted the bank to foreclose, 5' the California
Supreme Court rejected the mortgagor's argument that no lien ex-
isted because the instrument effectively restrained alienation.52
The Minderhout decision is significant because it demonstrates that
the California courts would no longer follow the traditional rule
against restraints on alienation. 3 The decision, however, is of lim-
ited precedential value. It does not support the notion that the appli-
cation of due-on-sale clauses is per se reasonable.54 The court
determined the validity of the bank's action solely in terms of foreclo-
sure rights, declining to address the matter of enforceability of the
mortgagor's promise not to convey or to encumber.55 Consequently,
47. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
48. Id. at 316, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508 (1964).
49 The Agreement of the Parties read: "In consideration of any loan by...
'Bank' 'Borrower' promises and agrees. . . if default be made (by borrower) in
the performance of any of the terms hereof [including transfer, non-payment of taxes,
or waste] Bank may, at its election. . . declare the entire remaining unpaid principal
and interest of any obligations or indebtedness then remaining unpaid to the Bank
due and payable forthwith." 61 Cal. 2d 311, 313, 392 P.2d 265, 266, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505,
506 n.2 (1964).
50. Id. at 313, 392 P.2d at 266, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 506 (1964).
51. Id. at 311, 392 P.2d at 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 505 (1964).
52 Id. The court unanimously held that § 711 of the California Civil Code disal-
lowed only unreasonable restraints. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West Supp. 1971). The
statute provides that "conditions restraining alienation when repugnant to the interest
created, are void." Id.
53 61 Cal. 2d 311, 316, 392 P.2d 265, 268,38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508 (1964). Applying
a reasonableness test, the court adopted the minority approach. See supra note 48
and accompanying text.
54. 61 Cal. 2d at 316-17, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
55. Id. at 317, 392 P.2d at 267-68, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508-09.
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the court left unsettled the question of the enforceability of due-on-
sale clauses.
In Hellbaum v. Lytton Savings and Loan Association ,56 the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals upheld the use of a due-on-sale clause when a
mortgagee invoked the accelerator provision to protect his security
interest.5 7 In Hellbaum, the mortgagee applied the accelerator clause
which caused the balance to become due immediately when the mort-
gagors failed to make a timely interest payment. This decision ex-
panded upon Coast Bank by recognizing that lenders properly invoke
due-on-sale clauses to protect their security interest. Thus, the
Hellbaum court cited an explicit instance when the application of the
accelerator provision is proper.
In Cherry v. Home Savings and Loan Association,58 the court of
appeals deviated from the reasonable standard articulated in Coast
Bank by upholding the inherent right of a lender to accelerate.5 9
When the mortgagor attempted to sell his property which the mortga-
gee secured by a deed of trust containing a due-on-sale clause,6" the
lender accelerated the debt.6 The mortgagor argued that the mort-
gagee applied the accelerator provision unreasonably; the court
disagreed. 2
56. 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969), disapproved in Wellenkamp v.
Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). For a detailed
analysis of Wellenkamp, see infra notes 86-115 and accompanying text.
57. 274 Cal. App. at 460, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 11. Furthermore, the court found no
support for the arguments that exercising the clause evoked a penalty or that tort
liability arose for lender's purported negligence. Id. at 459-60, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 14-15.
58. 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1969), disapproved in Wellenkamp v.
Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
59. 276 Cal. App. 2d at 580, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 139. The Cherry court followed the
majority approach. The mortgagee has "the power of free decision regarding the use
of its money by others, the right to determine in its own discretion whether it would
exercise its option, and it [has) no obligation to act only in a manner which other
might term 'reasonable.'" Id. at 579-80, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 139. Furthermore, "[t]he
courts cannot make better agreements for parties than they themselves [make]." Id.
at 580, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 139 (quoting Walnut Creek Pipe Distribs., Inc. v. Gates Rub-
ber Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 810, 815, 39 Cal. Rptr. 767, 771 (1964)).
60. Id. at 576, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 140. The clause allowed the mortgagee to declare
the balance of the loan immediately due and payable if the mortgagor sold the prop-
erty without the mortgagee's consent. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 578, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 139. A mortgagee cannot protect its principal if an
assuming buyer who extinguishes a mortgagor's personal liability fails to meet his
payment. While a mortgagee can foreclose, there is no guarantee that the sale will
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Departing from the established line of cases which enforced only
those due-on-sale clauses found reasonable, the Cherry court clearly
articulated the majority approach which Coast Bank previously re-
jected. The California Supreme Court, however, had yet to reaffirm
the majority view.
B. Unreasonable Use of Due-On-Sale Clauses
In LaSala v. American Savings and Loan Association,63 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court shifted its position regarding a lender's ability to
exercise a due-on-sale clause. LaSala, plaintiff-mortgagor, obtained
a loan secured by a deed of trust.' LaSala then executed a note and
a second deed of trust, further encumbering the property. Subse-
quently, American, defendant-mortgagee, threatened to accelerate
unless LaSala agreed to pay an additional fee and three percent in
interest because LaSala had breached the mortgage agreement by
further encumbering the property.65
The acceleration clause of the deed provided that "should Trustor
(mortgagor) sell, convey, transfer, dispose of or further encumber
said property. . . then Beneficiary (mortgagee) shall have the right,
at its option, to declare all sums due and payable.' 66 The court re-
yield enough of a return to mitigate a loss. Therefore, the mortgagee properly pro-
tects its pecuniary interest by forcing the mortgagor to obtain its approval before con-
veying. From an economic standpoint, a mortgagor saves money by refinancing if
prevailing interest rates decrease. For example, mortgagor "X" obtains financing to
buy a home which costs $120,000. After making a $20,000 deposit, "X" agrees to
repay the loan at the prevailing market rate of 10% for 40 years. If, however, the
interest rate drops to 5%, "X" should refinance at the new rate, thereby saving 5% a
year m interest costs. If, on the other hand, interest rates increase and the mortgagor
wants to sell to a third party, the mortgagee loses money by not adjusting the amount
of interest due to the prevailing rate. The third party who assumes the loan at below
market interest rates prevents the mortgagee from reusing the money which would
yield a higher rate of return. Thus, if interest rates increase and the mortgagor trans-
fers, the mortgagee is free to reuse the repaid principal and gain a higher rate of
return. Conversely, if interest rates decrease the mortgagor may refinance to reduce
his debt. Id. at 579, 81 Cal, Rptr. at 138. See generally Volkmer, supra note 12.
63. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
64. 1d. at 869, 489 P.2d at 1115, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
65 Id. at 870, 489 P.2d at 1116, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 852. LaSala refused American's
demand. Id. at 1116. The court stated: "Although American's due-on-encumbrance
clause is not per se an illegal restraint on alienation, the enforcement of that clause un-
lawfully restrains alienation whenever the borrower's execution of a junior encumbrance
does not endanger the lender's security." Id. at 877, 489 P.2d at 1121, 97 Cal. Rptr. at
857 (emphasis in original).
66. Id at 869, 489 P.2d at 1115, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 85 1.
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ferred to this provision as a due-on-encumbrance clause.67 A due-
on-encumbrance clause differs from a due-on-sale clause in that the
latter operates upon a transfer of property whereas a further encum-
brance triggers the former. The supreme court determined that while
earlier cases upheld the validity of due-on-sale clauses, none of those
cases considered the enforceability of due-on-encumbrance clauses.
68
It distinguished Coast Bank, Hellbaum and Cherry, reasoning that
those decisions considered "borrowers retaining their interest in the
property that stood as security for the debt."
69
The LaSala court also explained the differing effects that due-on-
sale and due-on-encumbrance clauses have on the mortgagor's inter-
est.70 The court held that due-on-encumbrance clauses unreasonably
restrain alienation absent a mortgagee's showing that it invokes these
provisions to protect its security.71 Although the scope of the opinion
considered only the encumbrance issue, it is a return to the minority
approach. The court applied this method again in Tucker v. Lassen
Savings and Loan Association.7u
Tucker questioned the application of a due-on-sale clause to an
installment land contract. 73 Tucker, the mortgagor, purchased prop-
erty and financed it with a loan secured by a deed of trust7 4 which
included a due-on-sale/encumbrance clause. 5 Tucker then entered
67. Id.
68. Id. at 879, 489 P.2d at 1122, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 880, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859. The court stated that "[a]
junior encumbrance. . . does not terminate the borrower's interest in the property,
and rarely involves a transfer of possession." Id. It also noted the possibility that
junior liens could lead to foreclosure and a "a transfer of possession," but reasoned
that this risk "cannot justify an endowment to a lender of an uncontrolled discretion
to accelerate upon the making of junior encumbrances." Id.
71. Id. at 881, 489 P.2d at 1126, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860. The court, however, re-
stricted its holding to due-on-encumbrance clauses, specifically declaring its approval
of the Coast Bank opinion. Id. at 882, 489 P.2d at 1124, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
72. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
73. Id. at 631, 526 P.2d at 1170, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 634. Under an installment land
contract the obligor cannot obtain legal title to property until he makes the final pay-
ment. Thus, until the obligor makes the last payment, he is seized of only equitable
ownership. See generally OSBORNE, supra note 34, at 79.
74. Id. at 630, 526 P.2d at 1170, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
75. Id. at 632, 526 P.2d at 1171, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 634. The clause stated that if
mortgagor should "sell, convey, or alienate or further encumber. . . [then] all obliga-
tions secured hereby, irrespective of the date expressed in any note evidencing the
same, at the option of the beneficiary and without demand, or notice, shall immedi-
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into an installment land contract.7 6 Upon learning that Tucker had
entered into an equitable sale, Lassen, the mortgagee, accelerated the
balance due.77 Tucker alleged that Lassen's application of the accel-
erator provision constituted an unreasonable restraint on aliena-
tion. 8 The supreme court, agreeing with Tucker's argument,79
articulated a new test to determine the effect of due-on clauses.
In focusing its inquiry on the correct method to measure the valid-
ity of due-on clauses, the court balanced "the justification for enforc-
ing a particular restraint" against "the quantum of restraint."8 By
adopting a format similar to LaSala it followed the test.8' The court's
opinion distinguished between the effect of an outright sale and an
installment land contract, 2 considering the use of due-on-sale
clauses as reasonable in an outright sale because "the terms of the
second sale usually provide for full payment of the prior trust
deed."83 But the application of these clauses to installment land con-
tracts "does not often provide the borrower with the means to dis-
charge the balance secured by the deed of trust."' 84 Thus, absent a
mortgagee's justification for the application of the clause, installment
land contracts unreasonably impair alienation. The court voided the
acceleration clause because it failed to satisfy the burden of justifica-
ately become due and payable." Id. at 633, 526 P.2d at 1171, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 635
n3
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 634, 526 P.2d at 1172, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
79. Id. at 640, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 640. Lassen appealed the lower
court decision which held that the application of the provision unreasonably re-
strained alienation, Id. at 634, 526 P.2d at 1176, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 636. The supreme
court held that the lower court correctly decided that the morgagee's use of a due-on-
sale clause was an unreasonable restraint on alienation. Lassen argued that it validly
used the acceleration provision to protect its pecuniary interest. Id.
80. id. at 636, 526 P.2d at 1173, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 637. The court reasoned that
-[T]o the degree that enforcement of the clause would result in an increased quantum
of the actual restraint on alienation in the particular case, a greater justification for
such enforcement from the standpoint of the lender's legitimate interests will be re-
quired in order to warrant enforcement." Id.
81 Id. at 635, 526 P.2d at 1172, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
82 Id. at 637, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638. The court decided that a
restraint on alienation arose when the mortgagee prevented the mortgagor from en-
tering into an installment land contract to convey his property. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting LaSala v. American Say. and Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. App. 2d at 880,
489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859 n.17).
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tion."5 Nonetheless, the Cherry court's recognition of the per se en-
forceability of due-on-sale clauses remained because Tucker limited
its application of the new test to installment land contracts. Conse-
quently, the burden to defeat the operation of due-on-sale clauses in
an outright sale remained with the mortgagor.
In Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 6 the California Supreme
Court extended the application of the minority approach to preclude
the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses to outright sales of prop-
erty.87 Wellenkamp attempted to purchase the mortgagor's land
which the Bank of America, the mortgagee, had secured by a trust
deed. 8 The mortgagee, however, refused to allow the assumption
unless the purchaser agreed to repay the loan at a higher interest
rate.89 Rejecting the mortgagee's demand, she brought suit to enjoin
the enforcement of the provision alleging that the clause's operation
necessarily restrained alienation.9"
In determining the merit of the allegation, the supreme court first
analyzed the cases in which other courts examined restraints.91 The
85. Id. at 640, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 640. The court found that due-
on-sale clauses are valid and enforceable only if the mortgagee can show that a threat
to one of its legitimate interests exists. The court recognized that legitimate interest
included the protection of the mortgagee's security from depreciation and waste. Id.
at 639, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
86. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). For a thorough dis-
cussion of this case, see Note, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America: .4 Victoryfor the
Consumer? 31 HASTINGS L.J. 275 (1979).
87. 21 Cal. 3d at 953, 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86. The court
declared, "we hold that a due-on clause contained in a ... deed of trust cannot be
enforced upon the occurrence of an outright sale unless the lender can demonstrate
that enforcement is reasonably necessary to protect against impairment to its security
or the risk of default." Id.
88. Id. at 946, 582 P.2d at 972, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
89. Id. The bank refused to allow Wellenkamp to assume the mortgage unless
she agreed to pay an increased interest rate. The original mortgagor paid interest at a
rate of 8% per annum. The bank sought 9 1/4% from Wellenkamp. Id.
90. Id. at 947, 582 P.2d at 972, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 381. Wellenkamp appealed to the
California Supreme Court when the California Superior Court sustained the bank's
demurrer. Id.
91. Id. at 947-49, 582 P.2d at 973-74, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83. By following th6
principles enunciated in LaSala and Tucker, the court answered the question of
whether a due-on-sale clause is enforceable in outright sales. In order for the plain-
tiffs to have standing, the court adopted a broader definition of an "outright sale." It
defined that phrase as a sale by a mortgagor of property who transfers his legal title.
Absent a revision of the meaning of the phrase, the court would have been unable to
hear the instant case as the Tucker definition remained extant. Id. at 950, 582 P.2d at
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Tucker opinion allowed the application of due-on-sale clauses to
"outright sales" presuming that buyers could tender full payment to
mortgagors.92 Conversely, Wellenkamp reasoned that in inflationary
times or "tight money" periods a buyer will assume a mortgagor's
loan because no other means of financing exists.9 3 If a mortgagee
accelerates, thereby negating the buyer's ability to assume financing,
a seller cannot convey his property.94 Using this expanded definition
of "outright sale" the exercise of a due-on-sale clause restrains alien-
ation.95 Finding such an impairment, the court questioned whether
the mortgagee's legitimate interests were such that the justification
outweighed the restraint.96
The court generally recognized that lenders exercise due-on-sale
clauses to protect their security interests.97 First, they invoke the pro-
vision to prevent waste and depreciation.98 Second, lenders reason-
ably enforce the clause where the effect of doing so denies buyers
who are not credit-worthy the opportunity to purchase the secured
property.99 In the instance case, however, the court rejected the
mortgagee's contention that it used the provision for justifiable
reasons. 100
The mortgagee argued that often waste or default occurs upon the
outright sale of land because purchasers lack the incentive to main-
tain the newly acquired property.' The court rejected this argument
and asserted that purchasers often make substantial down payments
on property to obtain the mortgagor's equity. 0 2 Consequently, they
974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383. See also Maxwell, The Due-on-Sale Clause: Restraints on
Alienation and Adhesion Theory in California, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 197, 206 (1980).
92. See Tucker v. Lassen Say. and Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 635-36, 526 P.2d
1169, 1172, 118 Cal. Rptr. 633, 636 (1974).
93 Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 950, 582 P.2d 970, 974, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379, 383 (1978).
94. Id.
95 Id. at 951, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384. "[T]he result in terms of a
restraint on ahenation is clear." Id. See Note, supra note 41, at 1113.
96. 21 Cal. 3d at 951, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
97 Id.
98. Id. See Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security: The Well-Being of
the Law. 53 CAL. L. REV. 151, 170 (1965).
99. 21 Cal. 3d at 951, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
100. Id. at 951-52, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
101. Id. at 951, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
102. Id. at 951-52, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
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have an equitable interest to protect as does the seller in his capacity
as a mortgagor. 10 3 Since these large deposits minimize the threat to
the mortagee's security, this argument standing alone fails to justify
the application of the clause. I"4
The mortgagee also asserted that it exercised the due-on-sale
clause in order to maintain its loan portfolio at current interest
rates. 10 5 It argued that since mortgagors can refinance in periods of
declining interest rates, mortgagees should likewise be able to protect
their financial interests by using the clause in times of increasing
rates. 10 6 Moreover, it stated that inflation increases business costs,
yet lenders must simultaneously offer a greater rate of return to at-
tract and maintain depositors. 107 To offset these rising costs, mortga-
gees invoke due-on-sale clauses to terminate mortgages which yield
below market interest rates.10 8 They can reinvest this money at a
higher rate of return.
While the court recognized that lenders bear great business risks in
inflationary periods, it refused to allow the mitigation of these risks
through exercise of the clause.'0 9 The court held that lenders should
apply the clause only to protect themselves against impairments of
their security." 0 The court believed that lenders should measure fi-
nancial risks such as inflation before setting interest rates."' 1 The
103. Id. at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384. The court recognizes that
once a possessor has equity in property, he has a vested interest in maintaining the
land. The key factor rests upon the finding of an equitable interest. The court does
not question whether the mortgagor or assuming purchaser possesses the equity. 1d.
104. Id. The court also noted that the purchaser of property in an outright sale
might, in fact, be a better credit risk than the original mortgagor. Id.
105. Id.
106. Respondent's Brief in the Court of Appeals, at 44, Welenkamp v. Bank of
Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
107. See Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 952, 582 P.2d 970, 976, 148
Cal. Rptr. 379, 385 (1978).
108. Id.
109. Id. The opinion stated: "we believe that exercise of the due-on clause to
protect against. . . business risk would not further the purpose for which the due-on
clause was legitimately designed, namely to protect against impairment to the lender's
security that is shown to result from a transfer of title." Id.
110. Id. at 953, 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86. See supra notes 73-
79 and accompanying text.
111. 21 Cal. 3d at 947, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385. By failing to con-
sider and to provide for these risks, lenders undoubtedly would be unable to stay in
business. It follows that the lenders cushion their rates to compensate for these
contingencies.
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court held: "it would be unjust to place the burden of the lender's
mistaken economic projection on property owners exercising their
right to alienate freely their property through the automatic enforce-
ment of a due-on-sale clause by the lender.""' 2 The court invalidated
the application of the clause because the quantum of restraint ex-
ceeded the justification for the provision's use.'1 3 In disapproving of
the Hellbaum and Cherry decisions, the supreme court conclusively
established that it would invalidate the use of due-on-sale clauses ab-
sent a lender's showing of security impairment.' 14 The Wellenkamp
decision decisively abolished the majority approach in California." 5
The California Supreme Court, however, left unanswered the ques-
tion of whether the Wellenkamp holding applied to all California in-
stitutional lenders or only state chartered Savings and Loan
Associations (S & Ls).
C. Federal Preemption
In Glendale Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Fox, I16 a fed-
erally chartered S & L challenged the applicability of Wellenkamp to
federally chartered lenders." 7 The S & L contended that federal law
exclusively controlled the regulation of the use of due-on-sale clauses
in home loans made by federally chartered lenders." 8 The Glendale
court declared that federal due-on-sale regulations preempt conflict-
ing state laws which invalidate accelerator clauses as a restraint." 9
112, Id at 953, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385. But cf. Malouffv. Midland
Fed. Sav, and Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 303, 509 P.2d 1240, 1244 (1973) (due-on-
sale clause valid when protecting lender from inflationary conditions).
113 21 Cal. 3d at 954, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
114 Id But cf. Occidental Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb.
469, 482, 293 NW.2d 843. 850 (1980) (due-on-sale clause does not restrain alienation
and is enforceable absent a showing of unreasonableness by mortgagor).
115. In fact, the California Supreme Court has refused to hear any case of this
type after Wellenkamp. Id,
116. 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
117. Id. at 904.
118. Id. at 906. See supra note 8 and infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
119. 459 F. Supp. at 910. Other cases holding that the FHLBB's due-on-sale reg-
ulations preempt state law include: Price v. Florida Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 524 F.
Supp. 175, 178 (M.D. Fla. 1981), afrd, First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Brown, 707
F.2d 1217 (2d Cir. 1983); Williams v. First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 500 F. Supp.
307, 308 (E.D. Va. 1980); Bailey v. First Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 1139,
1141 (CD. IlL. 1979). But cf. Williams v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Arlington,
651 F.2d 910, 922 (4th Cir. 1981) (court refused to decide preemption issue).
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The Glendale holding allowed federally chartered S & Ls to use due-
on-sale clauses in their home mortgage loans. The Glendale and Wel-
lenkamp decisions resulted in a paradoxical situation: unlike federal
lenders, state chartered S & Ls lacked the authority to use due-on-
sale clauses. 2 ' California state courts, however, refused to recognize
the Glendale holding and continued to limit federal lenders' use of
due-on-sale provisions.12 1
The California Court of Appeal, in De La Cuesta v. Fidelity Federal
Savings and Loan Association,12 held that state law controlled the
enforceability of due-on-sale clauses when lenders failed to show that
they invoked the clause to prevent impairment of their security inter-
ests.' 23 By holding that a federal regulation which gave federally
chartered S & Ls the right to include due-on-sale clauses did not pre-
empt state law,'24 the court recognized that the Wellenkainp doctrine
remained extant. 125
In Fidelity, the court heard three consolidated cases in which pur-
chasers of real property brought suit seeking injunctive relief to pre-
vent federally chartered S & Ls from foreclosing on property
following the application of the trust deeds' due-on-sale clauses. 126
Fidelity Federal asserted that federal due-on-sale law preempted
state law, and therefore it did not show that the mortgagors' sales
caused an impairment of its security.127 In short, Fidelity Federal fol-
lowed the Glendale court's holding that federally chartered S & Ls
are not bound by state law.' 28
120. This inconsistency financially disadvantaged state lenders. In Fidelity Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982), the Supreme Court cited
figures showing that state lenders lost over $200 million because the California state
courts denied them the rights to use due-on-sale clauses. Id. at 169 n.21 (1982).
121. See De La Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 328,
175 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981), rev'd, Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141 (1982).
122. 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 175 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1981).
123. Id. at 341, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
124. Id. at 336, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 473 (1981) (interpreting 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(0
and (g) (1983)).
125. Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr.
379 (1978). The Supreme Court of California determined that the operation of a due-
on-sale clause unreasonably restrains alienation unless the lender can reasonably
show that it used the clause to protect its security interest. Id.
126. 121 Cal. App. 3d at 330, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
127. Id. at 333, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
128. Id.
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The California Court of Appeal disagreed with Fidelity Federal's
contention, reasoning that while the Congress gave the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) plenary power to regulate feder-
ally chartered S & Ls, Congress did not intend to revoke state real
property and mortgage laws.' 29 By deciding that the regulations
promulgated by the FHLBB did not expressly preempt state law, the
court disregarded Fidelity Federal's reliance on Glendale.'30
While the court realized that Congress has the authority to pass
laws which expressly preempt state laws, it refused to equate congres-
sional intent with that of the FHLBB.13 ' The court reasoned that
prior to the passage of the FHLBB regulation which granted feder-
ally chartered S & Ls the authority to use due-on-sale clauses, Con-
gress had chosen not to enact any laws regulating the use of these
clauses.132  Thus, Congress consciously declined to regulate the
states' enforcement of due-on-sale provisions.
To support its holding against preemption, the court attempted to
harmonize state law with the FHLBB regulations. 133 It reasoned that
the state law did not impinge upon the FHLBB's ability to regulate
federally chartered lenders because it read Wellenkamp as a principle
of state property and mortgage law.' 34 The court stated that the
FHLBB regulation and the Wellenkamp rule could coexist because
the regulation authorized but did not compel the use of due-on-sale
provisions, and Wellenkam[ did not absolutely invalidate the use of
the accelerator provision.I 5
129. Id. at 336, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 471. The court reasoned that since almost all
state and federally chartered S & Ls conduct business entirely within one state, pre-
emption based on occupation of the field analysis was inapplicable. Preemption
founded on occupation of the field mandates that federal law supersedes state law
which regulates that field. It is immaterial whether the state law comports or conflicts
with the federal law. Id. at 336, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
130. 121 Cal. App. 3d at 339, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
131. Id. The court stated: "the decision whether to displace state law is a funda-
mental one going to the very fabric of federalism; thus, the decision is one to be made
by the people through their elected representatives in Congress rather than by agen-
cies or tribunals insulated from the democratic pressures." Id. at 339-40, 175 Cal.
Rptr. at 474.
132. 121 Cal. App. 3d at 341, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
133. Id. at 341, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
134. Id. at 341-42, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
135. Id. at 341, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 475. The court also rejected the contention of
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), which submitted an ami-
cus curiae brief, that the court should uphold preemption in recognition of the need to
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The Fidelity court's application of Wellenkamp to federally
chartered S & Ls left federally chartered lenders in a quandary. The
Fidelity and Glendale decisions reach contradicting conclusions al-
though the facts in the cases are nearly identical. The effect of the
Wellenkamp, Glendale, and Fidelity holdings taken together left fed-
erally chartered California S & Ls in the following anomalous posi-
tion: Borrowers challenging the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses
in trust agreements which either state or federally chartered S & Ls
held in state court could defeat the enforceability of the accelerator
provision provided that they showed that the lenders had unreasona-
bly used the clause. Conversely, borrowers whose trust deeds con-
taining due-on-sale clauses were held by federally chartered lenders
would probably fail in suing to defeat the operation of the clause in
federal court. The United States Supreme Court, by granting Fidel-
ity Federal's appeal, attempted to resolve the dichotomy.136
Affirming the Glendale decision, the Supreme Court held that the
FHLBB's regulation which allowed federally chartered lenders to use
due-on-sale clauses in mortgage agreements preempted conflicting
state law.'37 Basing its reversal on a preemption analysis' 38 the
Court first considered whether the FHLBB intended to preempt state
law."' Second, the Court examined whether the FHLBB's regula-
tion fell within the Board's statutory authority. 4 '
The Supreme Court decided that the FHLBB's regulations demon-
strated the Board's intention to preempt state law. 4 ' The Court also
stated that there are two types of preemption---express and im-
plied.' 42 Express preemption exists when federal law precludes the
application of state law.143 Lacking explicit preemptive language,
courts infer congressional intent to supersede state law when the
create and maintain uniform policies to regulate the use of mortgage agreements be-
cause Congress alone is the proper governmental entity to make such a finding. Id. at
342-43, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
136. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
137. Id. at 170.
138. Id. at 152. See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
139. Id. at 153.
140. Id. at 159.
141. Id. at 153.
142. Id.
143. Id. Express preemption is the clearest indication of Congress' intent to have
federal law supersede state law. See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 13, at § 1154.
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scope of federal regulation is so extensive as to create an inference
that Congress wanted federal law to displace state law.'" The Court
declared that in areas where Congress did not regulate fully, state
laws are valid only to the extent that they do not conflict with federal
law. 145
In holding that federal regulations and federal laws preempt con-
flicting state laws equally, the Court rejected the California Court of
Appeal's finding that only Congress can legislate to displace state
laws.' 46 The Court recognized that federally chartered S & Ls could
simultaneously comply with Wellenkamp and FHLBB regulation;
nonetheless it determined that the California courts' enforcement of
Wellenkamp frustrated the FHLBB's purpose of flexibility in regulat-
ing federal lenders.' 47 Finding that the FHLBB's regulations demon-
strated the Board's intention to preempt state law, the Court
considered whether the Board had received statutory authority to
make regulations which preempted conflicting state law.'
48
The Supreme Court concluded that the legislative history of the
Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA) sufficiently indicated Congress' in-
tent to give the FHLBB the power to regulate federally chartered
lenders.149 The Court noted that the HOLA's purpose was to stabi-
lize the home mortgage industry by providing funds to home pur-
chasers through the creation of a system of federally chartered S &
Ls."' The HOLA provided for the creation of the FHLBB to moni-
tor and to regulate federal lenders in order to carry out the congres-
sional purpose.' 5 The Court determined that the use of broad
144. Id. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
(when federal regulation is so pervasive as to allow inference that Congress left no
room for supplemental state law, the federal regulation preempts state law).
145. Id. See First Fed. Say. & Loan of Gadsden County v. Petersen, 516 F. Supp.
732, 737 (N.D. Fla. 1981), rev'd, First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Brown, 707 F.2d
1217 (2d Cir. 1983) (court upheld federal due-on-sale regulation over conflicting state
law).
146. 453 U.S. at 154.
147. Id. at 156. The Court also noted that the FHLBB restated its policy that only
the Board should delineate the guidelines which limit federally chartered lenders'
ability to use due-on-sale clauses in mortgage agreements. Id. at 155. See 46 Fed.
Reg. 39123, 39124 (1982).
148. 458 U.S. at 159.
149. Id. at 159-60.
150. Id. at 161. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
151. Id. at 160.
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language in the HOLA proved that Congress provided for no limits
on the FHLBB's power to oversee federal S & Ls lending practices. 15 2
The Court reached this conclusion by reasoning that Congress en-
acted HOLA and created the FHLBB to guarantee the financial sta-
bility of the home mortgage industry."5 ' Thus, by tacitly concluding
that the FHLBB perceived due-on-sale clauses to be a method by
which to preserve the ongoing operation of the mortgage industry,
the Court refused to allow conflicting state law to obstruct federal
policy.
The Supreme Court's Fidelity decision is significant because it re-
solved the federal preemption issue and effectively barred the appli-
cation of Wellenkamp to federally chartered lenders. The decision,
however, failed to provide relief for state chartered S & Ls which
would have to continue to follow the Wellenkamp rule. The Court
declined to overrule the Wellenkamfp rule; instead, it allowed the di-
chotomy between state and federally chartered S & Ls to persist. The
Supreme Court's Fidelity holding affirmed the Glendale decision but
it did not compel minority state courts to follow the regulation. In
order to achieve a consistent policy of enforcing the use of due-on-
sale clauses in mortgage agreements, Congress would have to
intervene.
After understanding the factors which courts consider when ques-
tioning the validity of due-on-sale clauses and examining the courts'
preemption cases, one may analyze the majority and minority tests.
Measurement of the propriety of either approach is meaningless
without examining the effects of implementation of the tests on lend-
ers and homeowners.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY TESTS
A. The Majority
The courts which follow the majority approach uphold the en-
forceability of due-on-sale provisions. They consider primarily the
economic impact that due-on-sale clauses have on institutional lend-
ers.' 54 Courts which espouse this approach recognize the inherent
152. Id. at 161. The court noted, however, that the power of the FHLBB is not all
inclusive, but it did not define the limits of its preemptive authority. Id. at 164.
153. Id. at 168.
154. See Cherry v. Home Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 579, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 135, 138 (1969). "[A] due-on-sale clause is employed permitting acceleration of
the due date by the lender so that he may take advantage of rising interest rates in the
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right of lenders to accelerate for several reasons. First, lenders have
an obligation to their depositors.'55 In return for depositors' invest-
ments, S & Ls invest depositors' money by financing such loans as
mortgages. The S & Ls must pay interest on the savings of their de-
positors. Since they must lend money at a profitable margin to avoid
insolvency, they must invest their borrowedfunds prudently. Theo-
retically, they check the credit-worthiness bf potential mortgagors
before making a home loan. Yet if the lender lacks the ability to
control a mortgagor's power to dispose of property through assump-
tion, an S & L might lose its investment because an assuming pur-
chaser has insufficient funds to meet the obligation. 5 6 Thus, these
courts uniformly allow lenders to invoke due-on-sale clauses as a
means to protect their security.' 57
Second, judicial awareness of the economic realities of lending
money in a period dominated by high interest rates 58 results in judi-
cial support for portfolio maintenance. 5 9 Economic justification for
maintaining the repayment of loaned dollars at current interest rates
exists. As stated above, S & Ls must maintain an income sufficient to
meet creditors' demands. To remain solvent, lenders must not only
protect their principal, but must also maximize their interest income.
event his borrower transfers the security. This is merely one example of the ways
taken to minimize risks by sensible lenders." Id.
155. See Crockett v. First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 626, 224
S.E.2d 580, 585 (1976) (lenders finance loans to maximize profits for benefit of
depositors).
156. See Mutual Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wisc. 2d
531, 540, 239 N.W.2d 20, 24 (1976). "[Ilf the lender in his evaluation of the business
character and reputation of a subsequent obligor believes collection may be more
difficult and foreclosure more probable than in the case of the original borrower...
[the lender may] exercise its option in a 'due-on-sale' clause." Id.
157. Id. Even courts which take the minority view allow due-on-sale clauses.
See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 953, 582 P.2d 970, 976-77, 148
Cal. Rptr. 379, 385-86 (1978).
158. See Note, supra note 86, at 291. "Stable rates of interest, however, are a
thing of the past. The average cost of funds to federal savings and loan associations
rose 50% from 1965 to 1976, while average yield on mortgage portfolios lagged be-
hind, increasing 34%." Id.
159. See, e.g., Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tenn. 1973).
[Savings and loan] under their contract have the right to insist upon the repay-
ment of their loan (sic) in the event of sale, so that they can relend the money at
an increased interest rate, and so maintain their supply of lending money, at the
level of their present cost of such money.
Id. See Bonanno, supra note 36, at 271.
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For example, an S & L lends money to a mortgagor who pays five
percent interest per annum for thirty years. But if the lender col-
lected interest income at current market rates, which measure about
ten percent, then the S & L in effect would more than double its earn-
ings. This increased income would more than offset the financial ob-
ligation which S & Ls have to their depositors. In fact, these
institutions could lend the excess to creditworthy individuals thereby
expanding the mortgage market. The due-on-sale clause is a primary
mechanism by which S & Ls can terminate long-term mortgages
yielding below market rates.
Due to compelling economic reasons for allowing the use of due-
on-sale clauses, courts which adopt this approach place the burden
on the homeowner to rebut the presumption of the provision's valid-
ity.'6 Courts permit the exercise of the clause unless homeowners
satisfy the burden. Homeowners can overcome this presumption by
proving adhesion or unconscionability.16 1 Alternatively, they can
demonstrate that the sale of the home does not impair the lender's
security. 16
2
The effects of the majority test are multifarious. Arguably, while
not adhesive, the invocation of the clause might prevent homeowners
from selling property because buyers cannot afford to purchase with-
out assuming at sellers' mortgage rates.1 63 To offset buyers' higher
interest rates, sellers will accept less money for the sale of their
homes. Consequently, the clause tends to reduce the interest rate
premium buyers pay when they assume a mortgage. Operation of
due-on-sale provisions indirectly constrain a homeowner's ability to
convey his property.
160. See supra note 86-115 and accompanying text.
161. See Maxwell, The Due-on-Sale Clause: Restraints on Alienation andAdhesion
Theory in California, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 197, 209-15 (1980) (points out that institu-
tional lenders possess greater resources and have great bargaining power in light of
their position as extenders of credit); Comment, Mortgages-A Catalogue and Critique
on the Role of Equity in the Enforcement of Modem Day "Due-on-Sale" Clauses 26
ARK. L. Rnv. 485, 499, 502 (1973) (standards for regulating application of due-on-sale
clauses).
162. See, e.g., Tucker v. Pulaski Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 854-55, 481
S.W.2d 725, 728-29 (1972) (mortgagee had obligation to justify its refusal to consent
to sale of mortgaged property to purchasers; there must be legitimate grounds to re-
fuse to accept a transfer, such as no impairment of security).
163. See Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 950-51, 582 P.2d 970, 974-
75, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 383-84 (1978). See also Note, supra note 41, at 1113 (1975).
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Conversely, S & Ls cannot invoke the clause absent a sale.1 " In
addition, recognition of the per se validity of the clause avoids litiga-
tion on an ad hoc basis. Although S & Ls initially use the provision to
protect their security, invocation of the clause now allows lenders to
generate current interest rate income.' 65 Application of due-on-sale
clauses permits homeowners to obtain low-cost financing, the balance
of which does not become due in fewer than five to seven years. 166
While these clauses may have a detrimental effect on the individual
homeowner, their use tends to stabilize the mortgage market.
B. The Minority
The minority approach recognizes the inherent right of a home-
owner to convey his fee. 167 Courts adhering to this view believe that
the application of due-on-sale clauses impairs practical alienabil-
ity. 168 These courts, therefore, place the burden on the lender to
show a valid reason for exercising the acceleration clause.169 Courts
164. One court declared that acceleration in no way restrains alienation. The
-[home] owner is free to convey without legal restraint and the conveyance does not
cause a forfeiture of the title, but only an acceleration of the debt." Occidental Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 472, 293 N.W.2d 843, 845 (1980).
165. When inflationary economic conditions exist and interest rates continue to
increase, it becomes more expensive for a home buyer to finance the purchase of a
home as the percentage of interest owed on the loan is higher than in less inflationary
periods. If a homeowner sold his home and allowed the buyer to assume the mort-
gage at a below market rate, the buyer would avoid the effects of the inflated cost of
borrowing money. Lenders who allow this assumption cheat themselves of income
because if the prospective buyer had to obtain financing at the prevailing interest rate,
the lender would receive a higher rate of return on his investment. Thus, due-on-sale
clauses allow lenders to maximize their interest income by keeping their loan portfo-
lios at current rates.
166. Homeowners repaying their mortgage obligations will find it less financially
burdensome to repay their obligations in even payments over long periods of time,
like thirty years. Conversely, borrowers who have to pay their entire obligation
within five to seven years face the difficulty of having to pay increasing monthly rates.
The long-term mortgages enable borrowers to acquire the funds necessary to
purchase a home.
167. See, e.g., Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61, 64 (Miss. 1975) (an incident to
ownership is owner's inherent right to sell and transfer his property).
168. While technically the invocation of a due-on-sale clause poses no direct re-
straint on alienation because a mortgagor has the right to convey his land, in practice,
the minority believes that the provision's use effectively restrains alienation. See Wel-
lenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 951, 582 P.2d 970, 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379,
384 (1978).
169. See supra notes 86-115 and accompanying text.
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enforce the provision if a lender can demonstrate that it uses the
clause to prevent impairment to its security.' 70 Thus, the minority
realizes that S & Ls must act to protect their pecuniary interest.
For the minority to limit its acceptance solely to the security,
though, is inconsistent. The California Supreme Court found the at-
tempts of S & Ls to use the clause to update their mortgage portfolios
unreasonable. 17' Loan portfolios of institutional lenders embody
mainly long-term mortgages upward of thirty years. 72 S & Ls set the
amount of interest based upon the prevailing market rates when the
parties consummate the mortgage agreement, so the interest yield re-
mains stable over time. But when interest rates increase dramati-
cally, S & Ls find it more difficult to lend money because their below
current mortgage interest income limits their ability to finance
loans. 173
The financial woes of S & Ls continue to worsen in 1980 and 1981
because these institutions paid depositors only 5.5 percent interest on
savings. 71 While the federal government insures some savings ac-
counts, many depositors reallocated their funds into money-market
accounts which pay the prevailing interest rate. 7 ' S & Ls found
themselves in a severe financial bind because their income from
mortgages was less than prevailing market rates. Additionally, the
170. See, e.g., Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 578-79,
181 Cal. Rptr. 135, 139 (1969).
171. Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 951-52, 582 P.2d 970, 976, 148
Cal. Rptr. 379, 385 (1978). The court specifically "reject[ed] [the] contention that the
lender's interest in maintaining its loan portfolio at current interest rates justifies the
restraint imposed by exercise of a due-on-sale clause upon transfer of title in an out-
right sale." Id. This court held: "a restraint on alienation cannot be found reason-
able merely because it is commercially beneficial to the restrainor." Id. at 953, 582
P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385. LaSala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d
864, 880-81 n.17, 489 P.2d 1113, 1124 n.17, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 860 n.17 (1971).
172. See Note, supra note 86, at 291. "[T1he average maturity on loans made by
associations has been estimated. . . at 28.4 years for new homes and 26.6 years for
existing homes." Id.
173. Common sense dictates that one cannot predict the future. S & Ls set their
interest rates by evaluating present costs, not future expectations. See Bonanno,
supra note 36, at 301.
174. Scharff, The Savings Revolution, TIME, June 8, 1981, at 58, 65.
175. See id. at 60-61. In 1981, depositors withdrew over $43 billion from banks
and S & Ls, reinvesting in money markets which often earn a return of 17%. Id. at 58,
65.
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inability to attract depositors further restricted S & Ls' cash floW. 17 6
The vast majority of S & Ls lost money, 77 and the courts refusal to
allow the application of due-on-sale clauses further debilitated the
ability of S & Ls to generate profits. Courts which denied the availa-
bility of the clause for portfolio maintenance ignored the financial
realities under which institutional lenders operated. It is anomalous
for the minority to validate the protection of security and to reject
attempts to maximize interest income at current rates.' 78
Arguably, lenders act unconscionably in applying due-on-sale
clauses as a hedge against inflation and rising costs when they fail to
state this purpose expressly in the mortgage. While homeowners may
contemplate that a due-on-sale provision results in the acceleration of
the debt, they are unaware that the effect of a sale also tends to in-
crease the interest rate for the assuming purchaser. To eliminate the
confusion, due-on-sale clauses should clearly explain that upon sale
the lender retains the option to reset the rate of interest. Such a state-
ment eliminates the problem of unconscionability.
Diverse effects result from the application of the minority view.
Judicial placement of the burden on the lender of showing reasona-
bleness forces S & Ls to justify their use of accelerator clauses.'
Thus, homeowners may freely convey their mortgaged property un-
less the mortgagee can demonstrate a legitimate reason for using the
clause. Consumers laud this result. A problem arises in determining
what constitutes reasonableness. The lack of a clear and uniform
standard for review had compelled litigators to bring suits on an ad
hoc basis. These ad hoc suits waste court time and increase legal
costs.
When invalidating due-on-sale clauses, minority courts place the
consumer's interest above that of the lenders. Perhaps these courts
believe that consumers occupy bargaining positions which are infer-
ior to that of institutional lenders. From a financial standpoint, how-
ever, minority courts overlook the economic impact of a lender's
176. Id. at 68. In 1980 the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) regarded almost 250 of the 4,560 S & Ls as "problem cases." Id.
177. Id. at 58. To avoid insolvency, more and more of these institutions merged.
In the past three years over 200 S & Ls combined to avoid liquidating. Id.
178. In light of the prevailing inflationary economy, the protection of interest in-
come is as important as the protection of the principal investment.
179. The Wellenkamp, Tucker and LaSala courts placed the burden on the lender
to show reasonableness. See supra notes 86-115 and accompanying text.
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inability to earn income at current rates. Since Wellenkamp, 18° Cali-
fornia S & Ls have shunned the use of due-on-sale clauses. Unlike
their federally chartered counterparts, state lenders were disabled to
the extent that they could not offer long-term, even-payment mort-
gages. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board permits lending institu-
tions under its jurisdiction to use due-on-sale clauses.181  Thus,
homeowners seek long-term mortgage financing from federal S & Ls
because state institutions lack the means to make these loans.
IV. ALTERNATIVE FINANCING INSTRUMENTS
A. Variable Rate Mortgages
The Wellenkamp court believed that the inability to apply due-on-
sale clauses did not damage state lenders because they have other
available methods of mortgage financing.' 8 2 In fact, state chartered S
& Ls resorted to other forms of lending to fill the void Wellenkamp
created. Two of the more popular alternative financing instruments
that are available are variable rate mortgages and rollover mortgages.
The variable rate mortgage8 3 (VRM) is another method of mort-
gage financing which operates to insure that lenders earn interest in-
come at the prevailing market rate. 84 Lenders structure VRMs so
that when a specified interest rate index fluctuates, the interest rate
payable on the mortgage correspondingly changes.' 5
The advantage of this financing method is that lenders obtain a fair
return on their investment. Homeowners also benefit because the
VRM provides for long-term repayment of the mortgage. VRMs fix
the schedule for repaying much of the principal but allow for varia-
180. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1975). See Andrew, Crea-
tive Financing Ends in Foreclosurefor More Home Buyers, Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1982 at
1, col. 6. "In California, the economic pressures for creative financing were given
impetus... when the state supreme court ruled that the due-on-sale clause in most
California mortgages is illegal" because of the Wellenkamp decision. Id. at 19, col. 1.
181. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board resolved to enpower federal S & Ls to
invoke the due-on-sale clause in Resolution No. 75-647, FED. HOME LOAN BANK
BOARD (1975).
182. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 950, 582 P.2d 970, 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 383 (1975). See
Note, supra note 86, at 292.
183. For a thorough discussion of VRMs, see Bonanno, supra note 36, at 301-04.
184. See Kunkel, The Due-on-Sale Clause and Alternative Mortgage Instruments
1981 DEL. C.L. REV. 1105, 1121 (1981).
185. See Cowan and Foley, New Trends in Residential Mortgage Financing, REAL
ESTATE FINANcING-TODAY AND TOMORROW 120 (1978).
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ble interest rates. Theoretically, VRMs treat the lender and home-
owner fairly, since the rate of interest payable can fluctuate on either
direction depending upon economic conditions.
In practice, however, VRMs hinder borrowers. Economic indica-
tors demonstrate that the interest rate will continue to rise. 186 Should
the economic slump persist, interest rates will probably increase dras-
tically. The effect of such a dramatic rise encourages mortgage fore-
closures because homeowners will lack the funds to meet their
obligations. Unless legislators place a ceiling on the interest rate pay-
able, VRMs will lose their attractiveness to a significant segment of
borrowers. 187
B. Rollover Mortgages
A second type of financing instrument lenders use to maintain cur-
rent interest income is the rollover mortgage.18 8 The typical rollover
mortgage allows homeowners to amortize payment of the principal
over a long period at a fixed rate. Lenders recalculate the rate of
interest payable periodically and set a new interest rate for a new
loan, in effect canceling the loan unless the parties agree to renew. 189
Lenders benefit most from this form of financing. They may either
renew the loan in order to bring it up to current interest rates or can-
cel it in the hope of reinvesting to obtain a higher return. There is no
ceiling to the rise in the interest rate.' 90 Lenders who retain the op-
tion to cancel enjoy a tremendous advantage over borrowers.
Conversely, borrowers who agree to rollover mortgage financing
186. See Scharff, The Saving Revolution, TiME, June 8, 1981 at 58, 65. "[A]t cur-
rent rates of inflation, money will lose about 10% in value each year." Id.
187. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1916.5 (Deering Supp. 1983) which states:
(2) The rate of interest shall change not more often than once during any semi-
annual period, and at least six months shall elapse between any two such
changes.
(3) The change in the interest rate shall not exceed one-fourth of one percent in
any semiannual period, and shall not result in a rate more than 2.5 percentage
points greater than the rate for the first loan payment due after the closing of the
loan.
ld.
188. For an explanation of how rollover mortgages operate, see Cowan and Fo-
ley, New Trends in Residential Mortgage Finance 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1075,
1084-85 (1978).
189. Id.
190. See Hill, California S d Ls Signal Impeding Demise of Fixed-Rate 30- Year
Home Mortgage, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1981 at 37, col. 1.
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are in a precarious position since they may have to pay a higher inter-
est rate or satisfy the entire debt because the balance becomes due in
only a few years. If a borrower conveys his home before the rollover
mortgage matures, he avoids difficulty. If the balance becomes due
and the borrower can neither afford to meet higher interest payments
nor find a buyer, foreclosure results. Absent an agreement by the
lender to refinance, rollover mortgages deny homeowners the stabil-
ity that long-term, even-payment mortgages containing due-on-sale
clauses offer.
V. CONCLUSION
The minority view of due-on-sale clauses places the burden of
showing reasonableness on lenders because courts fear that innocent
homeowners occupy an inferior bargaining position. Homeowners
often enter into mortgage contracts without seeking the advice of
counsel, and they fail to understand the legal implications of the
agreement. To alert buyers that they may find it difficult to sell their
homes, mortgages containing due-on-sale clauses should state clearly
in bold print that lenders retain the option to accelerate upon sale
and also reserve the right to demand the payment of a higher interest
rate by the assuming purchaser. Arguably, such an explicit statement
will obviate the need for placing the burden of reasonableness on
lenders.
Minority courts reject lenders' attempts to invoke the due-on-sale
clause based on economic grounds. They hold that in practice the
use of the accelerator provision inhibits alienation. While minority
courts realize that state lenders must protect their pecuniary interests
by invalidating the accelerator provision to maximize profits, they
protect the consumer because of the drastic effect of the clause. In
light of the poor performance of S & Ls, the financial need of lenders
to maintain their portfolios at current rates has never been greater. It
is logically inconsistent for minority courts to protect a lender's secur-
ity and disregard its interest income. Minority courts fail to recog-
nize that long-term, fixed-rate mortgages attract potential
homeowners by guaranteeing them steady payments. VRMs are too
risky to homeowners who might lack the means to repay should in-
terest rates skyrocket. Short-term mortgages which mature in fewer
than five years also fail to resolve the problem because there is no
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guarantee that homeowners can meet the obligations.19" '
To complicate the problem further, state lenders found it unfeasi-
ble economically to lock themseleves into long-term, fixed-rate mort-
gages without being able to increase their income to offset the
increasing cost of funds. Potential homeowners can obtain the more
stable long-term mortgages from federally chartered S & Ls which
received legislative approval to use due-on-sale clauses. 192 The di-
chotomy between federal lenders, who can use the accelerator clause
to extract higher interest rates, and those state S & Ls who were pre-
cluded from benefiting by the provision results in a threat to the sur-
vival of the state institutions.1 93
While both home purchasers and institutional lenders need the sta-
bility which due-on-sale clauses offer in times of increasing interest
rates, the courts have failed to respond adequately. The United
States Supreme Court's Fideliy decision precluded the application of
Wellenkamp to federally chartered lenders. The Court, however,
failed to free state chartered S & Ls from the effect of the Wel-
lenkamp rule. Consequently, in order to achieve a uniform policy
concerning due-on-sale clauses in mortgage agreements, Congress
must intercede.
Congress has resolved the inconsistency between the courts which
follow the majority and minority approaches by passing an act which
allows all S & Ls to use due-on-sale clauses in their mortgage agree-
ments. 9 4 The Gan-St.-Germain Depository Institutions Act of
191 Savings and loans and other thrift institutions first used rollover mortgages
before the depression. President Roosevelt targeted the improvement of the housing
market to stimulate the economy. Believing that lenders' use a rollover mortgages
undercut the objective of the New Deal, federal legislation expressly disapproved of
mortgages which ballooned after only a few years. See Ahearn, Usury: The Deposi-
tory Insttution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 1981 ARIz. ST. L.J.
211-14 (1981).
192. See People ex rel Deukmejian v. Glendale Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 122
Cal. App. 3d 860, 865, 176 Cal. Rptr. 353, 358 (1981) (the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board is not subject to state jurisdiction so Wellenkamp is inapplicable).
193. As the Court noted in Fidelity Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141 (1982), the California state court's restrictions of state chartered S & Ls'
ability to use due-on-sale clauses caused state lenders to lose over $200 million in
1981. Estimates indicated that if the minority restriction applied nationally, losses of
over $1 3 billion would result. Id. at 145 n.2 (1982).
194. See S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The new act, which applies
prospectively, allows both state and federally chartered S & Ls to invoke due-on-sale
clauses not only to protect their security interests but also to update their loan
portfolios.
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1982, 19 received Congressional and executive approval and became
effective October 15, 1982. Congress intended the Act to stabilize the
finance business.' 96 In keeping with its objective, Congress author-
ized the use and enforceability of due-on-sale clauses in mortgage
instruments notwithstanding any state statutory or common law to
the contrary.' 97 The new law provides that the terms of the contract
govern the lender's right to apply the accelerator provision.1 98
The effect of the new federal law is to preempt conflicting state
laws which barred the use of due-on-sale clauses. 199 The Act in-
cludes one exception to the federal preemption, allowing a three-year
period to expire before loans made in jurisdictions which denied the
enforceability of due-on-sale clauses by non-federally chartered
banks and savings institutions to use these accelerator provisions.20°
The validity of the Act remains unchallenged; at present, the law
195. 12 U.S.C. § 1701-23 (1982).
196. Id. Congress considered the following adverse effects on due-on-sale restric-
tions on the finance business:
Due-on-sale restrictions provide an advantage for existing homebuyers at the ex-
pense of new homebuyers. New homebuyers are punished by due-on-sale re-
strictions either by having to pay an inflated price for an existing home with a
lower interest rate assumable loan, or by having to pay a premium for a new loan
for a new home, or an existing home without an assumable loan.
Due-on-sales clauses encourage risky lending practices which intensify default
risks. Studies have shown that due-on-sale clauses may lead to the total disap-
pearance of the long-term fixed rate mortgage.
For lenders, due-on-sale restrictions further extend the lives of older low inter-
est mortgages, and prevent lenders from increasing the yields on those loans at
the time the property is transferred.
Due-on-sale restrictions also adversely affect secondary mortgage markets,
which rely on uniform, homogeneous mortgage documents to efficiently operate
and provide mortgage money for lenders and homebuyers.
Also, the recent Supreme Court decision in Fidelity Federal Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. De La Cuesta significantly disadvantaged state-chartered and other
lenders, and created uncertainty among homebuyers and sellers regarding the
enforceability of due-on-sale clauses.
Act of Oct. 1, 1982, P.L. No. 97-320 (96 Stat.) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3 S.
REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20.21, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3054, 3075-75.
197. 12 U.S.C. § 1701-03(b)(1) (1982).
198. 12 U.S.C. § 1701-03(b)(2) (1982).
199. Id.
200. 12 U.S.C. § 1701-03(c)(1) (1982). When borrowers transfer loans made in
minority jurisdictions which previously invalidated the enforceability of due-on-sale
clauses, the effect of the new law prevents lenders from invoking a due-on-sale clause
for a period of three years after the transfer. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol26/iss1/4
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upholds the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses uniformly through-
out all jurisdictions. Consequently, the use of due-on-sale clauses by
commercial lenders will continue as a viable method of home
financing.
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